Steven Beard

PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science
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Education:
PhD in Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2019 (expected)
      Dissertation: "War Processes and War Termination"
      Committee: Jaroslav Tir (Chair), Meg Shannon, Josh Strayhorn
      Major field: International Relations
      Minor field: Political Methodology
      Third field: Comparative Politics
Master of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M
      University, 2010
      Concentrations: Defense policy and Military Affairs, American Diplomacy
Bachelor of Arts, University of Colorado, 2006
      Major: International Affairs
      Honors: Magna cum Laude, member of Phi Beta Kappa honor society

Research and Teaching Interests
International Relations
International Conflict and War
Military Strategy
Foreign Policy
Methods (particularly game theory)

Publications
Beard, Steven and Joshua A. Strayhorn. 2018. "When Will States Strike First?: Battlefield
      Advantages and Rationalist War." *International Studies Quarterly.* 62(1): 42-53.

Non-peer reviewed publications
Beard, Steven. 2018. "Is There Really Evidence for a Decline of War?" *Think Peace.* OEF
      Research. May 5, 2018. http://oefresearch.org/think-peace/evidence-decline-war.

Dissertation:
Title: "War Processes and War Termination"
Committee: Jaroslav Tir (Chair), Meg Shannon, Josh Strayhorn

How do interstate wars end? I explore this question in my dissertation by developing the
bargaining model of war (e.g. Fearon (1995, Powell 2006, Wagner 2000, Filson and Werner
2002 and others) to include a more detailed account of war processes. In particular, I examine
how military strategy affects interstate bargaining and how this relates to war termination.

Several significant developments emerge from this examination. First, it becomes apparent that there are in fact two fundamentally different bargaining situations in interstate wars. Ground wars occur where the states attempt to take and hold territory and can achieve their objectives militarily. Punishment wars occur when the states only inflict costs on their opponent through bombardment or guerilla attacks, and must rely on their opponent voluntarily making concessions to achieve any changes to the status quo. Second, examining war termination relative to the military situation at the end of the war shows that standard bargaining explanations fail to adequately explain the actual end of most wars. Wars typically end before credible commitment issues have been fully resolved. However, most wars do not appear to involve freely negotiated settlements, as war outcomes tend not to be intermediate to the two sides' war aims and tend not to involve one side making preemptive concessions before they have been militarily lost. I argue that in ground wars, defensive advantages present commitment problems internal to the war, inhibiting war termination until one side has achieved their war aims. However, once one side, and particularly the stronger, has achieved their war aims, defensive advantages actually cement a war ending settlement. In contrast, punishment wars must end with the revelation of private information, as the combatants cannot achieve their aims militarily. However, revealing this information, about the possibility of a ground invasion in the case of bombardment and about the possibility of eliminating guerilla forces in guerilla conflicts, can take significant time, as individual engagements reveal very little information. I empirically test these theories with originally coded data on military campaign outcomes. I supplement the quantitative analysis with multiple case studies, demonstrating that the hypothesized mechanism does occur.

Teaching Experience
Graduate Part-Time Instructor
      American Foreign Policy (Summer 2015, Fall 2015, Spring 2017)
      War, Peace and Strategy (Summer 2016)
      Introduction to International Relations (Summer 2018)
Teaching Assistant
      Introduction to International Relations (Fall 2014, Spring 2016)
      Quantitative Research Methods (Fall 2013, Fall 2016)
      Introduction to International Affairs (Spring 2013)

Working Papers:
"The Logic of Power Shifts, Commitment Problems and Rational War" (has been and will be under review)
"A Rationalist Model of Coercion"

Conference Participation
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2018: Junior Scholar Poster Presentation, "Compellence in a Bargaining Framework."
Four Corners Conflict Network Annual Conference, 2018: Presentation, "Compellence in a Bargaining Framework."
Four Corners Conflict Network Annual Conference, 2018: Discussant-presenter
ISSS-ISAC Annual Conference, 2017: Presentation, "The Logic of Power Shifts, Commitment Problems and Rational War"

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2017: Presentation, "The Logic of Power Shifts, Commitment Problems and Rational War"

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2017: Presenter, "Exogenous and Endogenous Power Shifts as Causes of Rationalist War"

Four Corners Conflict Network Annual Conference, 2017: Presenter, "Exogenous and Endogenous Power Shifts as Causes of Rationalist War"

Four Corners Conflict Network Annual Conference, 2017: Discussant-presenter

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2016: Presenter, "When Will States Strike First? Battlefield Advantages and Bargaining Breakdown" (with Josh Strayhorn)

Four Corners Conflict Network Annual Conference, 2016: Presenter, "The Fog of War: Examining Private Information and War Termination."

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2015: Presenter, "The Fog of War: How combat fails to reveal private information and prevents combatants from committing to a war settlement."

Awards

University of Colorado Graduates in Political Science best paper award, 2017 for "The Logic of Power Shifts, Commitment Problems, and Rational War"

Best Qualifying Paper, University of Colorado Political Science, 2014, for "The Fog of War: How combat fails to reveal private information and prevents combatants from committing to a war settlement."

Grants and Fellowships

Competitively awarded One Earth Future's ABD fellowship for the 2017-2018 academic year. This both covers tuition and provides a stipend, worth approximately $30,000.

Academic Service

Graduate Student Representative, Methods Hiring Committee, Fall 2016

Reviewer, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*

Discussant-presenter, Four Corners Conflict Network 2017, 2018

Methods Training:

Passed comprehensive exams in political methodology

Coursework: Scope and Methods, Quantitative methods sequence (Including OLS regression and MLE estimation), Formal Modeling sequence, Network Analysis, Qualitative Methods

Additional training: CU summer methods camp (2013-2017): Time Series analysis, Multi-level modeling, Bayesian modeling, Causal Inference, Spatial modeling

Software proficiency: STATA, R, LaTeX, Mathematica, Excel